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The paper uses data from the National Hockey League (NHL) to consider the potential 
gains to firms from employing culturally-diverse work teams. It finds that the presence of foreign 
workers does increase firm-level performance – NHL teams that employed a higher proportion 
of European players performed better. However, the results also indicate that teams perform 
better when their European players come from the same country, rather than being spread across 
many European countries – when teams have players from a wide array of European countries, 
integration costs associated with language and cultural differences may start to override any 
gains from diversity.   
 


















"I've got Americans.  I've got Canadians.  I've got Finns and Swedes and Czechs.  If I ever get 
fired, I can always get a job at the United Nations." 
  Herb Brooks, as the N.Y. Rangers' coach 
 
I. Introduction 
The trend towards more globalized product and factor markets has relevance for 
economists across a wide variety of economics sub-fields, including macroeconomic policy 
analysis, international trade policy, industrial organization, public finance, and labor economics.  
In studying issues related to globalization, economic analyses have generally taken what could 
be termed an institutional perspective, in that the unit of analysis is typically at some aggregated 
level, such as ―governments‖, or the ―firm‖. For example, with the latter, most research has 
focused on the impersonal interactions of the firm in the market, rather than, say, analyzing any 
intra-firm impacts of globalization.   
As a result, there is a dearth of literature examining such issues as the micro-level effects 
of culture and language on firm output. This absence is likely due to data limitations. To 
systematically examine the effects of culture and language within a firm, one would need a host 
of detailed data – the nationalities of all workers must be identifiable, each worker‘s skills and 
output must be measureable, as well as the collective output of the firm, and all other factors of 
production must be able to be held constant. 
In general, it would be very difficult to find examples of organizations where such data 
are publicly available. There is an exception, however, and that is the professional sport industry 
in North America. This paper focuses on one particular segment of that industry – the National 


















high (compared to other North American sports leagues) proportion of foreign (i.e. non-North 
American) players. Second, these foreign players come from a wide range of European countries, 
thus bringing together on NHL teams a mix of many cultures and languages.  Lastly, the nature 
of the game of hockey is such that on-ice teammate interaction effects are strong, and much 
greater, for example, than in a sport like baseball. 
Our paper constructs an empirical model that measures the effects of workplace diversity 
on firm performance. In particular, it examines the extent to which team output in the NHL is 
impacted by the presence of foreign players on the team – examining both the number of foreign 
players on a team, and, even more importantly, the composition of the foreign player group. 
With the latter, the question is this: all else equal, does the specific nationality mix on a team 
matter? In other words, for a given number of foreign players on a team, is it better to have all 
foreign players from a single country, or should teams attempt to employ foreign players from a 
variety of countries?    
 
II. The Market for “Teammates” 
The work of Lazear (1999b) provides a theoretical foundation for this paper. In Lazear‘s 
seminal work, he notes how the topics of ―globalization‖ and ―teamwork‖ are ever present in 
today‘s business media, and proceeds to examine how the intersection of these issues might 
affect the labor market decisions of the firm.1 
The trend towards integrated world markets – on both the product and input sides – has 
led to the rise of what Lazear calls the ―global firm‖. He defines the global firm as one whose 
employees originate from a variety of different cultures or countries. Lazear argues that this 


















present.  Because workers within a global firm have different cultures, legal systems, and 
language, the firm must now incur additional costs to integrate these workers into a cohesive 
team.  Conversely, these integration costs are not incurred by firms whose employees are 
homogenous. 
The question, then, that naturally arises is what benefits do culturally-diverse work teams 
provide? Any benefits must be sufficiently large so as to overcome the additional integration 
costs that the firm incurs. Lazear argues that there are a number of factors that determine the 
magnitude of these gains to a firm. Perhaps most importantly, the more disjoint the skill sets of 
the worker groups, the greater the benefits of diversity. If Group A has different skills than 
Group B, there are gains to the firm of hiring some of both workers, rather than hiring 
exclusively from Group A or exclusively from Group B. In practical terms, some skill and 
knowledge sets might be culture-specific – one country or culture might be more likely to have 
certain skills, for whatever reason, than another.  Thus, firms whose employees represent a 
diverse range of cultures will have greater collective knowledge and skill within the 
organization. Conversely, if the skill and knowledge sets of Group A and Group B overlap, the 
gains from employing a diverse workforce are diminished.2  
Lazear focuses largely on developing a theoretical model, and only minimally examines 
any empirical evidence. He claims that the question is not really amenable to empirical analysis, 
stating ―At the empirical level, it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain direct measures of who 
works with whom. Even if this could be done, it would then be necessary to obtain information 
on the characteristics, skills, and knowledge of the individuals who are engaged in team 


















ambitious empirical approach, and examines trading patterns by country, where he finds that 
countries are more likely to trade with other countries who speak the same language. 
We generally agree with Lazear of the near impossibility of obtaining the intra-firm data 
that would be required to properly test the assertions of the theoretical model.  However, there 
does exist an important exception to this generalization. Certain segments of the professional 
sports industry in North America – particularly the National Hockey League (NHL) – have 
characteristics and data availability that allow for empirical testing. NHL teams are, in Lazear‘s 
terms, global firms – they employ workers (players) from a variety of non-English-speaking 
countries, all of whom are integrated into a single work group (i.e. team).  Furthermore, the data 
needed to properly conduct the empirical tests is available: we know who works with whom, 
since team rosters are directly observable; team output is unidimensional and easily measureable 
(i.e. team winning percent); the quality of individual team members is measureable and publicly 
available, and; the wage rates of all workers are public information. In addition, a wealth of data 
exists on a host of other control variables necessary to conduct the empirical analysis. 
By using the NHL as our testing ground, we hope to overcome some of the limitations of 
other empirical work on diversity that has followed Lazear. The general lack of availability of 
detailed, firm-level, data on workers has led some researchers to examine the issue at a more 
aggregated level. For example, Ottaviano and Peri (2006) found that the productivity of US-born 
citizens was higher in those US cities in which there were a higher percentage of foreign-born 
residents, implying that the productivity of the native population rises as the workforce become 
more culturally diverse.  In a somewhat similar vein, Ottaviano and Peri (2005) find that average 
wages and employment density were higher in US cities that had greater linguistic diversity, 


















The limitation of these studies, in the context of this paper, is that the unit of analysis is at such a 
highly aggregated level (i.e. that of ―cities‖) that no insights can be gained into the intra-firm 
dynamics of cultural diversity, and hence no insights can be gained pertaining to the formation of 
optimal work teams within a firm. 
There have been a few attempts to examine the issue at a more intra-firm level. Both 
Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2004) and Leonard and Levine (2004) use proprietary data sets 
to measure the impacts of worker diversity – including cultural diversity – on intra-firm 
performance.3 Hamilton et. al, using data from a California garment maker, find that work teams 
(of sewers) that had greater diversity in skills across workers were more productive – 
hypothesizing that this may be attributable to lower-skill workers learning from higher-skill 
workers. With respect to ethnicity, they found that teams comprised of only Hispanic workers 
were more productive than other teams, all else equal.  Leonard and Levine (2004) used data 
from an undisclosed firm in the retail industry, and examine worker diversity across that firm‘s 
more than 800 stores. They find that sales (and sales growth) variations across stores were 
generally not predicted by the degree of gender or ethnic diversity of those stores, but that sales 
were negatively affected by age diversity. 
While the proprietary data sets of Hamilton et. al and Leonard and Levine allow them to 
empirically examine intra-firm cultural diversity in ways not otherwise possible, these studies 
still possess significant limitations; limitations which we believe can be better overcome by  
using professional sports as a focus. 
First, both of the above studies use data that pertain to only a single company, raising 
questions about whether their findings are simply artifacts of those companies‘ unique set of 


















organizations that generally employ low-skilled labor. It is likely that foreign workers in these 
organizations did not emigrate to take these jobs, or were internationally recruited in any way – 
they were individuals who were presumably already in the country and simply happened to find 
employment with this firm.  This again raises questions as to whether the findings are applicable 
to global firms that employ more high-skilled international workers.  Third, there is also a 
question as to the actual extent of coworker interaction in the firms studied. While the sewers in 
the garment manufacturer did work in formal teams, the nature of the tasks involved did not 
require sophisticated interaction processes. In Leonard and Levine‘s retail stores, there were no 
work teams as such – all employees of a particular store were simply considered to come from a 
single team. 
In addition to these more general critiques, questions and concerns arise with both papers 
regarding the specific way in which cultural diversity is measured.  In Hamilton et. al., there are 
nine different ethnic groups represented in the garment factory, but their empirical analyses uses 
only two dummy variables to capture the ethnicity factor – one to designate all-Hispanic teams, 
and the other to designate two-thirds Hispanic teams. This parsimonious approach fails to 
capture the richness and complexity of the issue, since it does not measure the impacts of all 
ethnicities on all teams, nor does it measure the possible interaction affects amongst the 
ethnicities. 
Leonard and Levine‘s measure is stronger, as they employ a Herfindahl index to measure 
the concentration of ethnicities on a team. However, other issues remain. Data limitations 
necessitate that they use very broad ethnic categories – for example, they use a category of 


















the Philippines, etc.), despite the obvious cultural and language differences across these 
countries. 
It is our contention that the NHL data set used in this paper is ―cleaner‖ than the ones 
used in these studies, and will allow for a more detailed and rich analysis of intra-firm cultural 
integration.  Not only is the information content on employees broader and deeper, NHL teams 
are much more global in the sense that they actively recruit workers from other countries, and are 
not simply employing US residents who just happen to have family roots in other countries, 
however long ago that may have been. Furthermore, unlike, say, factory or retail workers, NHL 
teams employ high-skilled labor, purchased in a world market, whose interactions with each 
other are essential to team output and success. 
There exists very little literature that uses the sports industry to study teammate effects in 
firms.  Idson and Kahane (2000, 2004) are an exception – they examine teammate effects on 
compensation in the NHL, and find that coworker attributes do affect individual player pay. 
Their models, however, did not address the specific question examined in this paper – i.e. that 
relating to the mix and concentration of foreign players on a team, and the corresponding 
diversity benefits that may accrue to the team. 
 
III. Foreign Players in the NHL 
A Trend towards Europeans: 1970 to Present 
Of the four major North American professional sports leagues, the NHL has the most 
ethnically diverse player group. During the 2007-08 season, players from 20 different countries 
played at least one game in the NHL. North Americans (Canadians and Americans) still 


















steadily rising over the past 30 years. In the 2007-08 season, approximately two-thirds of players 
were North American (Canadian or American), while one-third were European. Within the 
European group there is also considerable diversity – 4% of all NHL players were from Russia, 
6% were from Sweden, 12% were from the Czech Republic, and 4% were from Finland, with the 
remainder being from a variety of European countries. 
The first European players began arriving in the NHL in the early 1970s4, and during that 
decade the number of Europeans grew steadily, albeit slowly. The NHL‘s interest in Europeans 
during the 1970s was partially spurred by the presence of the rival World Hockey Association 
(WHA), which operated from 1972-73 to 1978-79. The rival league viewed Europe, particularly 
Sweden, and to a lesser extent, Finland, as an untapped source of player talent, and saw the 
importation of such players as a means to more effectively compete with the established NHL.5 
Throughout most of the 1980s, Swedes and Finns made up the majority of European 
players in the NHL. Their numbers were supplemented by a small number of Czechoslovakian 
players, all of whom had defected from the Soviet-bloc country. Two players who later went on 
to become stars in the NHL – Alexandre Mogilny and Sergei Federov – were the first Soviets to 
defect, in 1989 and 1990 respectively. At about the same time as these defections, the Soviet 
Union began allowing a select number of veteran players (i.e. those supposedly well past their 
prime) to play in the NHL.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the number of players 
from Soviet-bloc countries began to increase dramatically during the early 1990s, as players 
could now voluntarily move to North America. 
Table 1 illustrates the increasing prominence of Europeans in the NHL over the past 40 
years by examining the NHL player draft. During the 1970s, only 3% of the players drafted were 


















during the 2000s.  Table 2 shows how the distribution of these players across European countries 
has changed through time. The early dominance of the Swedes during the 1970s and 1980s was 
gradually eroded by the large-scale entry of Russian and Czech/Slovak players. For example, 
during the immediate post-Soviet period of the 1990s, the number of Russians drafted jumped to 
37% (of all Europeans drafted), up from only 6% during the 1970s and 13% during the 1980s. 
During the 2000s, Russia has continued to have the most players drafted of any European 
country, although their numbers have dropped somewhat from the heights of the 1990s. 
In the current NHL, five countries – Russia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Sweden and 
Finland – have a significant critical mass of players in the league. Two other countries, Germany 
and Switzerland, while still having relatively few players in the league – have seen their numbers 
steadily grow over the past decade. This diversity across countries, and this critical mass of 
players in five countries, makes the NHL an attractive outlet to empirically test coworker 
heterogeneity theories.   
 
The Expected Gains from Diversity in the NHL 
In general, and following Lazear‘s work, one would expect there to be gains to NHL 
teams from employing an internationally diverse workforce. First, and most obvious, by opening 
the labor market to include European players (as opposed to relying solely on North American 
players), teams broaden the pool from which to choose. More importantly, at least for the 
purposes of this paper, is that European players may, in Lazear‘s terms, have skills that are 
somewhat disjoint from North America players. In other words, the skills sets are not completely 
overlapping. Furthermore, within Europe, players from each country may possess somewhat 


















In Europe, training methods for youth players are somewhat different than in North 
America, with a much greater emphasis in Europe on basic skill development, like skating, 
stickhandling, passing, and shooting.   In North America, greater emphasis is placed on actually 
playing games, as opposed to practicing fundamentals. Accordingly, many observers view 
European NHL players as having, on average, higher levels of basic skill development than 
many North Americans. Conversely, however, there is a perception amongst many, rightly or 
wrongly, that European players tend to play the game with a less physical presence, including 
body-checking and fighting. Since the style of play in the NHL tends to be much more oriented 
towards this physical play than hockey played elsewhere in the world, North American players 
have a comparative advantage in this area. 
Adding further complexity to the issue is that Europeans are not a homogenous group. 
Training methods and styles-of-play do tend to differ across European countries (although not as 
much as the differences between Europe and North America). For example, Finnish players are 
often considered to be more physical than, say, Swedish players. 
These potential gains to NHL teams from employing a diverse workforce must be then 
balanced against the increased costs of hiring the diverse workforce. Since European players 
possess a culture and language that is different from the dominant North American culture, NHL 
teams incur costs to hiring Europeans.  However, not only must NHL teams decide how many 
Europeans to hire, they must decide which types of Europeans. For example, if a team hires three 
Europeans, is there any difference, all else equal, between hiring three Swedes, versus one 
Swede, one Russian, and one Finn? Hiring from multiple European countries potentially 
increases the diversity benefits, but it also increases the potential communication costs.  English 


















This increases the possibility that communication errors may develop. One would suspect the 
probability of such errors would be less when two Swedes communicate, even if such 
communication were in English. 
In addition, players from different countries may impose different integration costs on the 
team. For example, the average Swede might be viewed as having better English skills than, say, 
an average Russian, and may be also more ―North-Americanized‖, and hence better able to 
integrate into the new environment. Also, there are considerable cultural and political differences 
between the European countries, and in some cases, long-standing historical tensions exist. For 
example, the Swedes come from a very small (in terms of population) country, known for its 
egalitarianism and socialist governments. The Russian players grew-up largely under 
communism, as did the Czechs, while the Germans grew up under a capitalist success story of 
the post-World War II era.  Europe has a long history, and many underlying tensions still exist, 
possibly making for integration of various European players more difficult. For example, the 
effective control of (then) Czechoslovakia by the Soviets in the Iron Curtain era could possibly 
result in Czech and Slovak players having residual negative feelings towards their Russian 
counterparts. 
The notion that some teams specialize in players from certain countries has received 
some attention in the sport media, and is echoed in some anecdotal opinions of players and 
coaches.  A 2006 Sports Illustrated article examined the issue, and noted that the New York 
Rangers had six Czech players on their (20-player) roster, thus devoting 30% of their roster to 
players from a nation that comprise only 10% of all NHL players. Jaromir Jagr, the (then) star 
player for the Rangers, was quoted as saying ―If you want Europeans on your team, you‘re better 


















talk easily to each other‖.  Similarly, the article also noted that Detroit employed 16% of the 
Swedes in the League, and quoted Detroit‘s GM as saying ―it wasn‘t a master plan to come up 
with all these Swedes, but once you do have a certain player, it makes sense to complement him 
with a similar type of player‖. 
 
IV. Model and Data 
 
Production Functions in Sport  
To test for the possible effects of worker diversity on firm-level production in the NHL, 
we employ the following general model: 
Firm performanceit = f(worker skillsit, managerial abilityit  ,worker diversityit) (1) 
where the subscripts i and t refer to team i and season t, respectively.  In essence, firm (i.e. team) 
performance in any given season is a function of the collective skills of the team‘s workers (i.e. 
players), the abilities of the firm‘s management (i.e. coaches) to effectively organize and direct 
the workers, and the degree of cultural diversity amongst the workers. The first two factors – 
worker skills and managerial ability – are control mechanisms which allow us to then isolate on 
our focus variable, the level of player diversity on a team.6 
This approach we take to specifying the production function is consistent with the general 
approach found in the literature pertaining to the economics of sport.  This literature is now quite 
vast, and spans over 50 years, dating back to Rottenburg‘s (1956) seminal article on the 
economics of baseball labor markets. Sport-related research can now be found in numerous sub-
disciplines within economics, including industrial organization, labor economics, and public 


















that the sport industry provides a level of data availability not typically seen in other sectors, thus 
allowing economists to empirically test theories in a manner not possible in most other 
industries. 
The use of production functions within the sport context is well developed, and Dobson 
and Goddard (2001) provide a comprehensive overview of the literature in this area.  They note, 
at the most basic and fundamental level, players and managers/coaches are the primary factor 
inputs, with on-field team performance being the measure of output. The first to formally 
estimate a sport production function was Scully (1974), who modeled the win percent of baseball 
clubs as a function of various player, management, and team characteristics.  Scully‘s ultimate 
goal was to measure the marginal revenue product of baseball players, thus allowing him to 
determine the degree of monopsonistic exploitation that baseball players were suffering in that 
era.  His general approach became the norm in the literature for these types of studies, with his 
methodology adopted by many subsequent researchers.7 
 
Dependent Variable 
As is standard in the sport literature, we measure team/firm performance by the team‘s 
sporting (i.e. on-ice) success during a given regular season. With the NHL, the issue is 
complicated somewhat by a 2005 rule change that altered the way in which points were awarded.  
Up until the 2003-04 season, if a game was tied at the end of regulation time, each team would 
receive a point in the standings and a five-minute ‗sudden death‘ overtime period was then 
played. 8  If one team scored in the overtime period it would receive a second point in the 
standings.  If, on the other hand, the teams remained tied after the overtime period, the game was 


















06 season (the 2004-05 season was cancelled due to a labor dispute), a new rule was 
implemented whereby teams that remained tied at the end of the sudden death period would then 
participate in a ‗shoot-out‘, with the winner of the shoot-out receiving the second point in the 
standings – thus, games could no longer end in a tie.9  With the implementation of the shoot-out, 
the end-of-season point totals between the pre- and post-lockout periods are not strictly 
comparable. 
Our data set spans these two different periods, thus in order to account for any potential 
effects that this rule change might have, we employ several alternative measures for team 
performance.  One is simply the team‘s win percentage (Win %), computed as the number of 
wins divided by 82 (the number of regular season games).  A second measure employed is the 
percentage of total possible points the team earned in a season (Points %).  This is computed as 
the number of points earned in the regular season divided by 164 (the number of points possible).  
A third measure we use is the difference between the number of goals-scored and goals-allowed 
during the regular season, (Goals Difference).  While none of these measures are entirely 
immune to the change in the way in which points were awarded in the pre- vs. post-lockout 
periods we believe that they should serve as a reasonable indicator for the regular season 
performance of teams.10  
 
Control Variables: Team Skill Levels and Coaching 
Two approaches are used in this paper to measure team skills.  One uses team-averaged 
career skill vectors.11  For example, we compute team-averaged values for (NHL) career points-
per-game (excluding the current season) and use this measure as a proxy for a team‘s scoring 


















points-per-game values by their share of minutes played during the current season.12  Other 
things equal, teams with greater scoring ability should perform better.  Similar measures are 
constructed for other team-level inputs such as the plus/minus statistic and penalty minutes per 
game.13  We expect that, ceteris paribus, teams with larger career plus/minus values should 
perform better as it may indicate teams with better two-way play.  As for penalty minutes per 
game, this measure has two opposing effects on a team‘s performance.  First, teams that receive 
many penalties may perform poorly, as they find themselves short-handed much of the time.  On 
the hand, teams with higher career penalty minutes per game may be indicative of teams that 
play aggressively which, in turn, may lead to greater performance.   In addition to these skater 
measures, we include a measure of goalie input equal to the weighted value of the career save 
percentage for each team‘s goalies.  All else equal, teams with better goalies (i.e., higher save 
percentages) should perform better. 
A second approach to measuring team skills is to use their relative payroll.  Specifically, 
we compute for each team the ratio of their current season‘s payroll to the league‘s average 
payroll for the current season.14  The underlying assumption here is that individual player‘s 
talents are reflected in their salaries, albeit imperfectly due to the various labor market 
restrictions that apply in the National Hockey League.  By summing these salaries across players 
on a team we get a measure of the team‘s overall talent.   Thus, teams with greater relative 
payrolls should have relatively greater skill and, other things equal, would have a relative better 
performance. We also include the squared value of a team‘s relative payroll to allow for 
diminishing returns of performance to payroll, as proposed by Simmons and Forrest (2004).  One 
advantage of the payroll approach over the use of team-averaged skill vectors is that relative 


















skills and mentoring abilities.   One possible disadvantage to using relative payrolls, however, is 
that it may be the case that player salaries do not accurately reflect playing skills.  This 
disconnection between salaries and skills may arise, for example, if there are differences in 
salary negotiation abilities across players or if there are considerable differences in restrictions to 
player mobility between teams.15 A further disadvantage of using payroll is the potential for 
reverse causation effects – whereby a team‘s payroll reflects, in part, what it is willing to pay for 
anticipated future performance.16 
Our final team skill measure is a variable equal to the number of top draft picks playing 
on a team.17  The aim here is to better identify the effects of the very high-impact/young ‗star‘ 
players, for whom salary and/or past career statistics may not be indicative of their value. Lastly, 
the measure used to incorporate coaching input is the head coach‘s career win percent, excluding 
the current season.18  Other things equal, it is expected that better coaches should be able to 
increase a team‘s performance. 
 
Focus Variable: Team Diversity 
We employ two measures of team diversity of players.  First, based on the country of 
birth for players, we sort players into five major geographic groups: North America (Canada and 
USA), Czech Republic/Slovak Republic, Sweden, Finland and Russia.  We then compute a 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) based on the shares of a team‘s players belonging to these 
groups.19 
One problem with the HHI measure as described above is that the vast majority of 
players (approximately 67%) are born in North America.  Given the construction of the HHI, 


















group.  As a means of dealing with this issue we simultaneously include a variable measuring  
the share of a team‘s players that are not from North America (denoted as Relative European 
Share).  With this added covariate, the HHI effect is now conditional on the proportion of a 
team‘s players who are European.  Taken together, these two measures should tell us which 
teams have relatively high concentrations of non-North American players and, given those 




The data used to estimate Equation 1 are from the 2001-02 through the 2007-08 NHL 
seasons for all 30 teams, excluding the 2004-05 season which was lost due to the player lockout.  
The resulting sample size is 180 observations; descriptive statistics and data sources are reported 
in Table 3. 
Table 4 provides further details on the data, and shows the mean values for each 
independent player performance variable, disaggregated by nationality.  As discussed in Section 
II, Lazear argues that the more disjoint the skill sets of the various worker groups, the greater the 
benefits of diversity. Table 4 does reveal substantial differences between North Americans and 
Europeans, and also differences within the European group. First, North American players have 
higher levels of penalty minutes, supporting the notion that Europeans employ a less-aggressive 
playing style than North Americans. Simultaneously, North Americans seem to be less-skilled in 
the offensive aspects of the game, as evidenced by their lower-than-average values for goals, 
assists, and points.  Within the European group, players from the both the Czech 


















other players, indicating particularly high offensive skills for players from these countries. Also, 
while players from Sweden produce more assists than the sample mean (at the 10% level of 
significance), they do not produce more goals, possibly indicating the Swedes are specialists in 
―setting-up‖ others to score goals, rather than scoring themselves. Finally, players from the 
Czech Republic/Slovakia have higher plus/minus values, indicating these players not only 
possess offensive skills (which earn ‗pluses‘), but also possess a corresponding attention to 
playing sound defense (which helps avoid ―minuses‖). 
In general, then, the data in Table 4 establishes quite clearly that players from different 
nationalities do, in fact, possess different skill attributes, supporting Lazear‘s notions that skill 
disjointedness across groups is necessary if firms are to be benefit from diversifying their 
workforce. What remains to be determined, and what is tested in the following section, is 
whether such diversity ultimately increases firm-level output.  To do so, any benefits that accrue 
from this broadening of the range of skills within the organization must more than offset the 
corresponding increased integration costs that will be incurred. 
 
V. Results 
The results are reported in Table 5, which shows fixed-effects regression results for 
regular season performance.  Across the various team performance metrics as dependent 
variables, the best fitting equations are for Win %. The variables Points per game and Relative 
payroll each have significant coefficients in the equations for Win % (columns 1 and 2), with 
little difference in goodness of fit. In addition to Relative Payroll or Points Per Game we find a 
statistically significant effect of Top Draft Players for the full set of team performance dependent 


















team performance, given payroll or points per game. In contrast we find no significant roles for 
our chosen measure of head coach ability, Coach Win % or for the supplementary indicators of 
player talent, Penalty Minutes Per Game, Plus/Minus Per Game and Save %. 
Our focus in the results is on team diversity, and we find that both HHI and Relative 
European Share have positive coefficients and are significant at 5% or better in all regressions 
except specification (2), where they are significant at the 10% level.  There are two main 
implications of our results on diversity. First, if two teams have the same degree of group 
concentration shown in its HHI, then the team with the greater share of European players 
performs better. Second, if two teams have the same share of European players then the team 
with a higher degree of group concentration performs better. These implications follow for any 
chosen measure of team performance displayed in Table 5. Overall, then, teams that are made up 
of mostly homogeneous European players appear to gain an advantage in team performance.20 
Some intuition for our findings on team diversity can be given by an example. Suppose 
that Team A has 30% North Americans, 20% Czechs, 20% Swedes and 10% each from Finland, 
Russia and Slovakia. This yields an HHI score of 0.20. In contrast, Team B has 20% each of 
North Americans, Czechs, Swedes, Finns and Russians. This also gives an HHI score of 0.20. 
Our results indicate Team B should perform better than Team A (more Europeans for a given 
HHI). Now consider a Team C that has 20% North Americans and 40% each of Swedes and 
Russians. Our model predicts that Team C will perform better than Team B. This is because team 
C has a higher concentration of Europeans even though it has the same total number of 
Europeans as Team B. 
Although the coefficient on HHI is statistically significant, we should consider its 


















HHI ranging in our data set from 0.265 to 0.792, this difference results in a 0.30 difference in 
Win Percent between the top and bottom teams by this measure, which does not appear 
plausible. However, when we control for Relative European Share in the models, changes in 
HHI reflect changes in the concentration within the European group. The relevant range of HHI 
then becomes much smaller as the following example shows.  Assuming a 20 player roster and 
14 North Americans on the team (about the average in the league), if all 6 Europeans are from a 
different country, then the HHI is 0.505. At the other extreme, if all 6 are from the same country, 
the HHI is 0.58. Thus, the range of HHIs is much tighter (at 0.075) than it is if we do not hold the 
number of Europeans constant. Thus, with a coefficient on HHI of 0.566, the top-to-bottom 
difference in HHI (attributable to differences within the European group) results in a difference 
in Win Percent of 0.04245, or about 3.5 games over an 82 game season, which does appear to be 
more plausible than 0.30 in the naïve interpretation above. 
 When we exclude Relative European Share but retain HHI as a covariate, we find that 
the coefficient on HHI becomes insignificant. How can we reconcile this finding with the earlier 
positive and significant coefficient on Relative European Share? 21 The explanation comes in the 
fact that our two measures of diversity are related, in that teams that have fewer Europeans will 
clearly have a lower value of Relative European Share but will also have a higher value of HHI. 
This is because HHI is picking-up the high concentration of North Americans; one minus 
Relative European Share gives the percentage of North Americans on a team roster. Hence, 
teams can have high scores for HHI in different ways: either a team has very few Europeans, or a 
team may have many Europeans, most of which come from the same country. Teams that have 



















Thus, if Relative European Share is excluded from the regressions, then HHI is 
aggregating the two separate and opposing effects just noted. These confounding influences 
deliver an insignificant coefficient on HHI. When Relative European Share is included in the 
models, we can account for cases where HHI is high simply because there are many North 
Americans (and few Europeans) on a team. Our incorporation of Relative European Share into 
the model facilitates an influence, found to be statistically significant, for the concentration level 
within the European group obtained through the now significant effect of HHI.22 
Some literature has examined a role for measures of payroll inequality to affect team 
performance in Major League Baseball, given size of relative payroll. For example, both Depken 
(2000), using a Herfindahl measure of payroll inequality, and Wiseman and Chatterjee (2003), 
using a Gini coefficient as measure of inequality, found that increased pay inequality was 
associated with worse team performance. To ensure that our NHL findings our robust to 
inclusion of payroll inequality, we added an intra-team Gini coefficient to our model. We find 
first, that the effects of HHI and Relative European Share remain positive and significant when 
the team Gini coefficient is an additional covariate. Also, the coefficient on the Gini measure of 
pay dispersion is itself insignificant.23  
As an additional robustness check, we included measures designed to capture players‘ 
skill levels prior to joining the NHL.  Specifically, we included in our basic regressions players‘ 
points-per-game for their performances in either North American college or junior leagues, or in 
European leagues. In all cases the coefficients of these added variables were not statistically 
significant, singly or jointly, and the coefficients of the remaining variables, including Relative 



















VI. An Extension: Diversity Effects at the Individual Level  
The above results suggest that there are two separate diversity effects in the NHL. More 
diversity is better, in the sense that teams that employ more foreign workers (i.e. Europeans, as 
designated by Relative European Share), relative to local (North American) workers, will tend to 
perform better. However, within this foreign worker group, diversity reduces team performance 
(as given by HHI) – i.e. when hiring foreign workers, it is better to have a higher concentration 
of workers from the same foreign country, rather than to have these foreign workers originating 
from many different countries. This latter result is likely due to integration costs. The more 
languages and cultures represented in a firm‘s workforce, the greater the communication costs, 
and the more difficult it will be to develop a harmonized and cohesive workforce. 
While Relative European Share was included in the Table 5 regressions largely as a 
control variable (to ensure HHI measured concentration within the European group only), its 
consistently positive and significant coefficient across the various specifications raises a related 
question as to what is driving this effect. The reasons are not entirely straightforward, and 
warrant further investigation. Initially, one might be inclined to explain the finding by the fact 
that Europeans are generally more productive players than North Americans – recall that Table 4 
shows Europeans outperform North Americans across a wide range of performance measures 
(goals, assists, points, plus/minus). However, these impacts are already controlled-for in our 
model – teams that employ more Europeans will already tend to have higher (beginning-of-
season) team-averaged values for Points per Game in Table 5. Thus, the consistently positive 
and significant coefficient on Relative European Share is due to something beyond the fact that 
the measureable skills of Europeans tend to be greater than that of North Americans. A second 


















(particularly Czechs/Slovaks and Russians) may be better able to divide their labor, with 
European players specializing in scoring and North American specializing in physical play.25  
A third possible explanation, and our focus in this section, is that the presence of 
Europeans on a team increases the productivities of North American players on that team. This 
question of positive productivity spillovers from foreign workers to local workers was addressed 
at an aggregated level in the aforementioned work of Ottaviano and Peri (2006), who found that 
the productivity of US-born citizens was higher in those US cities in which there were a higher 
percentage of foreign-born residents, implying that the productivity of the native population rises 
as the workforce become more culturally diverse.  In the NHL case, these spillovers could be due 
to direct on-ice production complementarities between European and North American players 
(for example, a North American winger scores more goals when playing with a highly-creative 
Swedish center) or could be due to more indirect effects. With the latter, the presence of 
European teammates may, for example, expose North American players to new training 
methods, to different psychological approaches to games, to different off-ice lifestyles and 
routines, etc.  Whatever the specific source of these complementarities, the presence of 
Europeans could increase the productivities of North Americans beyond what was expected from 
the latter‘s career performance to date (i.e. beyond what we have already controlled-for in our 
Table 5 regressions). Statistically, this complementarity effects would then be picked-up in the 
Relative European Share variable. 
To further explore these possible complementarity effects, we turn our focus to the 
individual player level, rather than the team level. We regress the performance of individual 
players (as measured, alternatively, by points, goals, and assists) in a given season on both the 


















the team for which he plays during that season.  Table 6(a) provides the results for individual 
North American players, and shows that Relative European Share is not significant in any of the 
six regressions. Thus, the complementarity hypothesis – whereby the increased presence of 
Europeans on a team increases the productivity of their North American teammates – is not 
supported.  North Americans, with their lower offensive-skill levels and more physical style-of-
play (see Table 4) are apparently unable to take advantage of playing with more offensively-
skilled European players.   
However, as a further test, we perform the exact same analysis for individual European 
players. These results are reported in Table 6(b), and show that in three of the six specifications, 
Relative European Share is significant, albeit at the 10% level. This would indicate that the 
productivity of individual European players is positively related to the number of European 
teammates that the player has (and, conversely, to the fewer the North American teammates he 
has).  
Thus teams that add more European players to their roster benefit in two ways, one direct 
and one indirect.  The direct benefit is that the European players added to the roster tend to be 
more highly skilled than the North American players they are replacing.  The indirect benefit is 
that by adding more European players, the productivity of existing Europeans is increased 
beyond what it would be otherwise.27 This latter effect may be due to Europeans having greater 
on-ice compatibility with other Europeans (compared to their compatibility with North 
Americans)28, or may be due to broader off-ice factors – for example, it may be that a greater 
number of Europeans on the team reduces the cultural dominance of the domestic (i.e. North 
American) group, thus allowing Europeans to more easily integrate, and to have less feelings of 


















These results in Table 6(b) would seem to indicate, then, that there is in fact a 
complementarity effect at work on teams. However, rather than the effect being Europeans with 
North Americans, as was originally speculated, it is actually Europeans with other Europeans.  
From a statistics perspective, this effect at the individual level would explain the positive 
coefficient on Relative European Share found in Table 5 – the presence of more European 
teammates increases the productivities of any given European player beyond what was expected 
given that player‘s career performance to date (i.e. beyond what is controlled for in Points per 
Game). This additional complementarity effect reveals itself in the Relative European Share 
variable. 
Importantly, the significance of Relative European Share in Table 6(b) is obtained 
holding HHI constant. Thus, the mere adding of European players, even if this does not change 
the concentration (HHI) level on the team, will increase the performance of existing Europeans 
on the team.  However, HHI is itself also positive in three of the six regressions, indicating that 
individual European players perform better when they are on teams where the European players 
have a greater homogeneity in their countries of origin. This result at the individual level for HHI 
supports our findings at the team-level, as reported in Table 5.   
We further refine our analysis by running a second set of player-level regressions similar 
to those shown in Tables 6(a) and 6(b), but with Relative European Share now being replaced by 
Percent Same, which is defined as the proportion of the player‘s teammates who are from the 
same country as the player.  Given a player‘s past performance, a positive and significant 
coefficient on Percent Same would indicate that less teammate diversity would increase 
individual performance.  These regressions were estimated by group (Table 7(a)), and then 


















7(a), the Percent Same variable has a statistically significant coefficient in the points and goals 
regressions for European players, but not for North American players. Table 7(b) further 
demonstrates that some European players tend to perform better when they play with teammates 
from the same country.  Specifically, Swedish players have significantly better points and assists 
performances (at the 5 percent level or better) when playing with a greater share of compatriots 
on a roster, for given levels of past performance. Russian players have significantly better goals 
records when playing with a greater share of fellow Russians on their roster, all else equal. We 
view these player-level results as further evidence that reduced diversity within the European 
group may enhance team performance, by raising the productivity of individual European 
players. 
 
VII. Summary and Conclusions 
The results of the paper imply that there can be benefits to a firm in expanding its 
workforce beyond the local, homogenous, group. The presence of foreign workers, like 
Europeans in the NHL, allow the firm to broaden its collective sets of skills and abilities, beyond 
what would be found if it only employed domestic workers.  
The paper found that NHL teams that add more European players to their roster benefit in 
two ways. First, there is a direct benefit, in that these players are generally more highly-skilled 
than the North Americans they are replacing. However, there is also an indirect benefit, in that 
adding more Europeans increases the productivity of the team‘s existing Europeans beyond what 
it otherwise would be.  
However, the results also indicate that NHL teams perform better when their European 


















countries. This would support the notion that communication costs are always a factor when 
attempting to diversify– when teams have players from multiple European countries, language 
and cultural barriers my start to override any increase in diversity benefits. More broadly, this 
implies that firms need to be cognizant of the way in which they diversify – our results suggest 
that the gains from diversity may be greatest when the foreign component of the workforce has, 



















 Europeans Drafted by NHL Teams 
 
2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s
Europeans Drafted, 
as a Percent of All 
Players Drafted
32 27 14 3
 




















Europeans Drafted, by Country, as a Percent of all Europeans Drafted  
 
2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s
Russia/Soviet Union 30 37 13 6
Sweden 22 20 38 56
Czech/Slovak 22 24 23 6
Finland 18 14 21 25
Germany 3 2 3 4
Switzerland 4 2 0 2
Norway 0 1 1 0
Denmark 0 0 1 0
 
























Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Win % 0.468 0.100 0.232 0.707
Points % 0.543 0.091 0.329 0.756
Goals Difference 0 41.976 -113 107
Relative Payroll 1.000 0.281 0.390 1.739
Points Per Game 0.444 0.069 0.243 0.675
Penalty Minutes Per Game 0.778 0.134 0.485 1.223
Plus/Minus Per Game -0.001 0.064 -0.205 0.169
Save % 0.908 0.008 0.886 0.935
Coach Win % 0.533 0.074 0.302 0.800
HHI 0.512 0.127 0.265 0.796
Relative European Share 1.000 0.347 0.331 1.953
Top Draft Players 0.261 0.489 0 2  



















Difference in Means, by Nationality  
 
Player Productivity Means, by Country of Origin*
Performance Measure
Country of Origin
Goals Assists Points Penalty Minutes Plus/Minus
USA/Canada (n = 2187 )
Mean 0.150 0.246 0.396 0.895 -0.016
Difference in Mean (p-value) -0.026 (0.000) -0.049 (0.000) -0.074 (0.000) 0.288 (0.000) -0.019 (0.002)
Czech Rep./Slovakia (n = 383)
Mean 0.185 0.302 0.485 0.608 0.022
Difference in Mean (p-value) 0.031 (0.000) 0.046 (0.000) 0.074 (0.000) -0.220 (0.000) 0.036 (0.000)
Sweden (n = 214 )
Mean 0.152 0.281 0.432 0.512 -0.009
Difference in Mean (p-value) -0.006 (0.442) 0.021 (0.077) 0.013 (0.461) -0.311 (0.000) 0.001 (0.902)
Finland (n = 124)
Mean 0.151 0.278 0.429 0.570 0.001
Difference in Mean (p-value) -0.007 (0.497) 0.017 (0.175) 0.009 (0.667) -0.241 (0.000) 0.011 (0.366)
Russia (n = 187)
Mean 0.211 0.337 0.549 0.606 0.002
Difference in Mean (p-value) 0.056 (0.000) 0.080 (0.000) 0.138 (0.000) -0.207 (0.000) 0.012 (0.389)
Other (n = 145)
Mean 0.158 0.255 0.416 0.781 -0.027
Difference in Mean (p-value) -0.000 (0.994) -0.007 ( 0.562) -0.004 ( 0.845) -0.022 (0.590) -0.017 (0.181)
* Mean values are pooled across players for all seasons and are for career per game performance.   The difference in means  reprsents the difference 
between the group identified  and  all other observations in the data  set.  The p-values are computed assuming unequal variances.  Bolded entries 


















Fixed-Effects Regressions for Regular Season Performance 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Relative Payroll 0.312* 0.250 145.5*
(0.178) (0.166) (72.59)
Relative Payroll Squared -0.102 -0.0758 -48.44
(0.0853) (0.0785) (36.30)
Points Per Game 0.415** 0.376*** 181.4***
(0.153) (0.127) (48.38)
Penalty Minutes Per Game -0.0203 -0.0136 8.213
(0.0666) (0.0646) (28.03)
Plus/Minus Per Game -0.0703 -0.00969 -24.88
(0.144) (0.124) (44.14)
Save % 0.0988 0.726 223.1
(0.897) (0.795) (317.3)
Coach Win % 0.120 0.0860 0.0827 0.0700 45.86 35.31
(0.0949) (0.0991) (0.0915) (0.0965) (42.68) (43.57)
HHI 0.566** 0.403* 0.618*** 0.489** 315.7*** 234.9**
(0.229) (0.201) (0.216) (0.200) (89.85) (90.92)
Relative European Share 0.213** 0.146* 0.224*** 0.173** 116.5*** 82.28**
(0.0822) (0.0718) (0.0787) (0.0724) (33.76) (34.46)
Post-lockout 0.0475*** 0.0372** 0.00637 0.000265 -10.40 -15.41**
(0.0140) (0.0172) (0.0133) (0.0161) (6.226) (7.323)
Top Draft Players 0.0329** 0.0448*** 0.0416*** 0.0507*** 24.57*** 29.44***
(0.0159) (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0131) (6.387) (6.635)
Constant -0.390 -0.162 -0.872 -0.100 -593.3* -314.6***
(0.855) (0.182) (0.740) (0.185) (293.6) (83.66)
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180
Teams 30 30 30 30 30 30
R-squared 0.267 0.273 0.180 0.177 0.194 0.199

















 Table 6(a) 
 Individual Productivity, North American Players 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES points goals assists points goals assists
lag of dependent variable 0.208*** 0.0345 0.146***
(0.0448) (0.0484) (0.0469)
Relative European Share -0.0229 0.00223 -0.0251 -0.0163 0.0128 -0.0279
(0.0719) (0.0317) (0.0502) (0.0888) (0.0448) (0.0589)
HHI -0.0924 -0.00583 -0.0866 -0.0466 0.0356 -0.0702
(0.185) (0.0829) (0.130) (0.228) (0.116) (0.154)
Post-lockout 0.0154 0.000774 0.0147** -0.0218* -0.00803 -0.00901
(0.0101) (0.00443) (0.00703) (0.0126) (0.00615) (0.00910)
Constant 0.468*** 0.149** 0.319*** 0.386* 0.123 0.299**
(0.164) (0.0727) (0.115) (0.205) (0.101) (0.136)
Observations 2,187 2,187 2,187 1,150 1,150 1,150
R-squared 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.045 0.004 0.024
Number of Players 693 693 693 490 490 490





















Individual Productivity, European Players 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES points goals assists points goals assists
lag of dependent variable 0.277*** 0.0721 0.231***
(0.0657) (0.0778) (0.0646)
Relative European Share 0.163* 0.0678* 0.0951 0.151 0.0106 0.149*
(0.0866) (0.0402) (0.0624) (0.109) (0.0501) (0.0853)
HHI 0.451* 0.185 0.266 0.580* 0.0891 0.499**
(0.247) (0.115) (0.179) (0.306) (0.147) (0.234)
Post-lockout 0.0152 -0.00486 0.0201* -0.0235 -0.0104 -0.00957
(0.0158) (0.00703) (0.0114) (0.0179) (0.00937) (0.0121)
Constant 0.0881 0.0176 0.0705 -0.0691 0.124 -0.153
(0.208) (0.0970) (0.150) (0.260) (0.126) (0.201)
Observations 1,053 1,053 1,053 568 568 568
R-squared 0.017 0.005 0.024 0.089 0.015 0.082
Number of Players 311 311 311 229 229 229



















Individual Productivity, Impact of Teammates from Same Country 
 
All Players North Americans Europeans
VARIABLES points goals assists points goals assists points goals assists
lag of dependent variable 0.231*** 0.0460 0.179*** 0.208*** 0.0351 0.146*** 0.280*** 0.0657 0.238***
(0.0378) (0.0420) (0.0383) (0.0447) (0.0482) (0.0469) (0.0657) (0.0770) (0.0648)
Percent Same 0.0469 0.0221 0.0286 -0.00491 -0.00218 0.00582 0.232** 0.105** 0.118
(0.0555) (0.0273) (0.0388) (0.0635) (0.0318) (0.0429) (0.109) (0.0493) (0.0886)
Post-lockout -0.0175* -0.00787* -0.00506 -0.0229** -0.00716 -0.0109 -0.0110 -0.00971 0.00281
(0.00917) (0.00465) (0.00650) (0.0112) (0.00547) (0.00808) (0.0156) (0.00834) (0.0109)
Constant 0.328*** 0.150*** 0.222*** 0.350*** 0.155*** 0.232*** 0.305*** 0.152*** 0.209***
(0.0330) (0.0160) (0.0219) (0.0442) (0.0218) (0.0282) (0.0442) (0.0213) (0.0320)
Observations 1,718 1,718 1,718 1,150 1,150 1,150 568 568 568
R-squared 0.054 0.006 0.035 0.045 0.004 0.024 0.085 0.020 0.070
Number of Players 719 719 719 490 490 490 229 229 229






















Individual Productivity, with Country Interaction Effects  
 
VARIABLES points goals assists points goals assists
lag of  dependent variable 0.233*** 0.0476 0.180***
(0.0379) (0.0423) (0.0384)
Percent Same -0.0303 -0.0122 -0.0181 -0.00782 -0.00237 0.00254
(0.0406) (0.0183) (0.0285) (0.0628) (0.0317) (0.0422)
Percent Same x Czech/Slovak 0.0679 0.0272 0.0407 0.161 0.0448 0.106
(0.167) (0.0562) (0.130) (0.206) (0.101) (0.158)
Percent Same x Swedish 0.546*** 0.246** 0.300** 0.432*** 0.120 0.356***
(0.182) (0.114) (0.129) (0.141) (0.0995) (0.134)
Percent Same x Finnish -0.313 0.0516 -0.364 -0.688 -0.334 -0.428
(0.566) (0.297) (0.341) (0.570) (0.281) (0.401)
Percent Same x Russian -0.110 0.0121 -0.122 0.276 0.195** 0.0300
(0.162) (0.0663) (0.120) (0.225) (0.0771) (0.186)
Percent Same x Other 0.0606 0.0999 -0.0393 0.335 0.190 0.104
(0.159) (0.0837) (0.0968) (0.338) (0.144) (0.244)
Post-lockout 0.0179** 0.000120 0.0178*** -0.0180** -0.00786* -0.00549
(0.00793) (0.00346) (0.00553) (0.00913) (0.00469) (0.00643)
Constant 0.439*** 0.160*** 0.279*** 0.334*** 0.150*** 0.229***
(0.0199) (0.00892) (0.0139) (0.0343) (0.0165) (0.0223)
Observations 3,240 3,240 3,240 1,718 1,718 1,718
R-squared 0.010 0.005 0.014 0.063 0.015 0.042
Number of Players 1,003 1,003 1,003 719 719 719
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1 In an earlier work, Lazear (1999a) examined the issue of cross-cultural assimilation and language 
acquisition by immigrants. The basic premise of that work was extended to the firm in his 
subsequent (1999b) article. 
2 Other researchers have also shown there to be gains from diversity, although none have done so in 
the context of Lazear‘s questions. 
3 Hamilton, Nickerson, Owan (2004) is actually designed very similarly to Hamilton, Nickerson, 
Owan (2003), but the latter does not explicitly consider the impacts of cultural diversity 
4 During the 1970s and before, there were a few prominent NHL players that were born in Europe 
(for example, Stan Mikita in Czechoslovakia, Ivan Boldirev in Yugoslavia, Juha Widing in Finland), 
but emigrated to Canada at a young age. For the purposes of this discussion, players such as these 
are not considered ―European‖. 
5 This strategy by the WHA is similar to what occurred with rival leagues (to the NFL) in American 
football, where both the All-American Football Conference in the late 1940s and the American 
Football League in the 1960s actively recruited an underutilized player group—in both those cases, 
the underutilized group was African American players. 
6 As a referee points out, an alternative way to describe our research approach is that we are 
determining how diversity affects the Solow residual in a firm-level regression.  
7 Out of this general stream of research a somewhat new direction emerged, one that focused more 
specifically on the particular role of management within the production process. As Dobson and 
Goddard note, the basic Scully approach is an ―average‖ production function, as opposed to a 
production frontier, and hence implicitly assumes the team production occurs at maximum 


















                                                                                                                                                                   
managers/coaches will have different abilities to convert inputs (players) into a given output.  In 
other words some managers will be more competent than others – whether due to training methods, 
on-field strategic decisions, motivational techniques, etc.  Thus, while the production frontier 
identifies the technologically efficient use of inputs, in practice, varying degrees of management 
ability across teams means that not all teams will be on this frontier. Numerous sport-related studies 
have employed the production frontier approach to investigate managerial inefficiency.  For 
example, Hofler and Payne (1996, 2006) use stochastic frontier estimation to examine the NFL and 
NBA, as do Dawson, Dobson, and Gerrard (2000) for English soccer; Ruggerio, Hadley, and 
Gustafson (1996) and Frick and Simmons (2008) employ both deterministic and stochastic frontiers 
to examine Major League Baseball and German soccer, respectively, while Kahane (2005) uses a 
stochastic frontier analysis to analyze the NHL. Kahane also employs a transcendental logarithmic 
production function, in addition to the Cobb Douglas function that is more typically found in the 
sport literature. 
8 In all seasons covered by this study a team that wins in regulation receives two points in the 
standings, the loser receiving zero points. 
9 The shoot-out consists of each team taking turns in a ‗one-on-one‘ contest between a player from 
one team and the goalie from the other team.  The winner in a three-round contest wins the game.  If 
the shoot-out remains tied in the three-round contest, then the shoot-out continues until one teams 
scores and the other team does not. 
10 Another possible complicating factor may be that the team strategies may have been affected with 
the implementation of the shootout.  It is our hope that such a possibility would not have a bearing 


















                                                                                                                                                                   
11 Others using this approach in sports research include Berri, Schmidt and Brook  (2006), Hofler 
and Payne (1997, 2006), Zak et al (1979). 
12 Two points with regard to the team‘s lineup.  First, player movement after the start of the season 
may complicate matters.  Our approach is to consider the player‘s team to be the team with which he 
started the season.  This approach seems appropriate given that players that do move during the 
season tend to do so well after the midpoint of the season.  Second, some players move up and down 
between their NHL team and its minor league affiliate.  In order to deal with this matter, we include 
in our weighted calculations of skill vectors only the top 18 skaters (i.e., non-goalies) in terms of 
total minutes played during a season. 
13 The plus/minus statistic is a crude attempt to measure the offensive and defensive skill of players.  
It is computed by awarding a player a +1 if he is on the ice when his team scores an even-strength 
goal.  The player is awarded a -1 if he is on the ice when his team allows an even-strength goal. 
14 Others using this approach include Kahane (2005), Simmons and Forrest (2004), Szymanski and 
Longley (2001), Dawson et al (2000) and Szymanski (2000). 
15 For example, players who have not achieved free agency may be underpaid, given their skills. See 
Krautmann et al (2009) for empirical evidence of this monopsony exploitation result across all four 
major North American sports leagues (baseball, basketball, football and hockey). 
16 Our concern here, however, is lessened in light of the work on Granger causality by Szymanski, 
Hall and Zimbalist (2002) that shows payroll causes performance, rather than the opposite. 
17 We only consider the draft years from 1994 to 2000 with the assumption these would be relatively 
younger players whose salary and/or career skill measures may not truly reflect their impact on the 
team.  We also include only players who have not been traded more than once and who played in at 


















                                                                                                                                                                   
at least half the season and/or have been traded more than once in a relatively short career are 
probably no longer considered "high impact" players. 
18 One issue with this measure is the fact that rookie coaches will have no value for career win 
percent.  In order to avoid losing observations due to missing data on this measure we have assigned 
rookie coaches the average value of all previously rookie coaches included in our data set.  
Regressions run that excluded rookie coaches produced virtually the same results for estimated 
coefficients for the other variables. 
19 We also computed the HHI with the USA and Canada separately.  Regressions using either 
version of these HHI measures produced similar results. 
20 Because the Detroit Red Wings were very successful over our sample period, and because they 
tended to employ a disproportionate number of Swedish players, as a robustness check we re-ran our 
regressions with Detroit excluded and found that HHI continued to be positive and significant in all 
six regressions.   
21 If there was a high degree of collinearity between HHI and Relative European Share then one or 
both of these variables would have statistically insignificant coefficients. But this is not the case so 
the two diversity variables each contribute explanatory power to the regression.   
22 As a robustness check, the regressions shown in Table 5 were re-estimated to include the 
interaction between HHI and Relative European Share.  These new regressions produced estimated 
coefficients with approximately the same size and significance as the ones shown in Table 5.  
Furthermore the coefficient to the interaction effect was statistically insignificant in all 
specifications, (results available upon request). 
23 Results available upon request. 


















                                                                                                                                                                   
25 This issue will be a topic for future research, since we are primarily concerned with interaction 
effects in this paper. 
26 We run specifications both with lagged dependent variables and without.  
27 Since our results show that NHL teams benefit both directly and indirectly from employing more 
Europeans, one might ask whether NHL teams comprised of only Europeans would perform better 
than teams that are a mix of Europeans and North Americans, thus eventually leading to North 
Americans no longer being present in the League.  However, there are at least two limiting factors 
that would make such an extreme outcome improbable. First, on the demand side, there is likely 
some type of fixed-proportion production technology at work here, where teams require a minimum 
number of the more physical-oriented North Americans to the allow the more-skilled European 
players to perform unfettered – i.e. teams comprised of exclusively Europeans could be vulnerable to 
intimidation tactics of teams that continued to employ North Americans. Second, on the supply side, 
with the game of hockey being generally of less prominence in Europe than in North America 
(particularly Canada), the talent pool in Europe is much less deep, and eventually the supply of 
NHL-caliber Europeans would be exhausted.  
28 If it is assumed that high-quality players perform better when they play with other high-quality 
players, and with Table 4 showing Europeans tending to be of higher-quality than North Americans, 
then it would seem that a typical European player should perform better when he plays with other 
Europeans, rather than with North Americans.  
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